

KEYNOTE SPEECH

RELIGION RADICALISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER *Jihadi- Salafi apocalypse under the scrutiny**

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Introduction

No wonder that the world changes in all of its aspect of life. Basically, the changes are natural process that can not be avoided by human beings. The epoch making changes in the world over the last 150 years have affected Muslims as well as non-Muslims and altered significantly how to see the world. These changes are enormous: globalization, migration, scientific and technological revolutions, space exploration, archeological discoveries, evolution and genetics, public education and literacy, to name some of them. We must add to this an increased understanding of the dignity of the human person, greater inter-faith interactions, the emergence of nation-states, the concept of equal citizenship and gender equality¹. Confronted by these changes, not all the religious people can accept it wholeheartedly due to the fact that changes make human beings experience some facts of uneasy life, instability, insecurity, inequality and injustice, a global capitalism which leads the huge gap between the rich and the poor, emotion of frustration, personal and social stress, hatred and fear.

To some extents, the apocalyptic theology in Muslim world is caused by these enormous changes in politics, society, culture and science as well as technology. All religious people are deeply affected by these changes, but the deepest, severe and radical response to these changes in our contemporary world comes from Muslim world. *Jihadi apocalypse* which leads the destruction of the building of World Trade Center (WTC) in New York in 2001 and the widespread flame of Arab Spring in ten years latter is the unique Muslim's response to the enormous changes in the contemporary era in the Middle East in particular and its great impact on the life of the Muslim all over the world in general.² The word "Jihad", contemporarily is closely related and connected with the "Salaf". This popular religious term

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¹Abdullah Saeed, *Interpreting the Qur'an: Towards a contemporary approach*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p.2.

²Reuven Paz, "Debates within the Family: Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, *Takfir*, Extremism, Suicide Bombings, and the sense of Apocalypse", in Roel Meijer (Ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, London: Hurst & Company, 2009, p. 271.

has been then branded into “*Jihadi-Salafi*”. Reuven Paz gives a description on what is being familiarly called by “*Jihadi-Salafis* as follows:

“The Jihadi-Salafis have turned the *jihad* into a dynamic one that purifies Muslim society through **small elitist fighting group**, which claim to be following the exact steps of the Prophet and his companions – “the pious generation” (*al-salaf al-salih*). Being *Jihadi-Salafi* means above all creating as closely as possible an exact copy of the first ideal generation of Muslims, **but primarily in the militant dimension**”³

There are many ideas, understanding, debates in the inner circle of Jihadi-Salafi groups. Above all those disputes and rivalries from within, at least cause the emergence of three doctrinal sources of Jihadi-Salafi:

- The first branch has been assumed to be originated in **Egypt** from among the radical sections of the **Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood** – mainly of Sayyid Qutb’s. Other sources were Egyptian exiles in Saudi Arabia, and the self-radicalised fathers of the Egyptian Jihad and Jama’at Islamiyyah in the 1970s.

- The second has its roots in **Saudi Arabia**, in **Neo-Wahhabism**, led by the mufti and prominent Shaykh ‘Abd al’Aziz ibn Baz and his disciples, who created among other issues, the Movement of the Awakening (*Harakat al-Sahwa*). During the 1990s, this branch was legitimised by the two other classes of Neo-Wahhabi scholars to which the older clerics belong, such as Muhammad ibn ‘Uthaimin as well as the younger clerics, who participated in the *jihad* in Afganistan such as Ahmad al-Khalidi and many others.

- The third branch derives from **Palestine**, and consists of the “Palestinian Trio” of Abdallah “Azzam, ‘Umar Abu Qatada, and above all ‘Isam al-Burqawi, othewise known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The latter is the spiritual father of the **fusion between the Wahhabi *tawhid* – unity of God – and the violent *takfiri jihad* – excommunication of the infidels**. They seem to be an inspiration for a new generation of Jihadi clerics, who have graduated from Saudi Islamic universities, primarily Jordanian-Palestinian, whose role have been significant in both Chechnya and Iraq⁴.

Basically, ***Jihadi* apocalypse and *Jihadi-Salafi* apocalypse as I understand is the mixed narratives of a vibrant and highly political spirituality life of the militant and radical Muslim groups in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world that has its deep root in their desperate and unsatisfyingly response to the administration of national government and the international policy, especially the United States of America and**

³Reuven Paz, “Debates within the Family: ...”, p. 270. The bold is mine.

⁴Reuven Paz, “Debates within the Family: ...”, p. 269.

its alliance toward Middle East affairs⁵. Above all, is their inability and unwillingness to converge and to build a constructive dialogue within their inner-selves between their strict and rigid interpretation and understanding of Islamic religious dogma - a puritan type of *aqeeda* which in salafism is concentrated in *tawhid* - and its implication in political, social, cultural and economic domains on the one side, and the idea of progress and modernity as it is exemplified in the ability of person to respect of dignity of the human person, to build a harmonious life between Muslim and non-Muslims in the era of a greater inter-faith interactions, and finally to understand the concept of equal citizenship under the nation-states and gender equality, on the other side.

The most unique and brilliant appearance of Jihadi-Salafi is the way they communicate, disseminate and infiltrate their ideas, propaganda, doctrines and debates to the audience especially the young generations using electronic and virtual media. The fact is that the term **e-jihad** becomes popular in the social media. They have a forum to discuss seriously the issues, the methods, the strategy, the tactic and the critique to evaluate what has been done in some countries or what should be done in other countries to implement their purpose and target and launch lethal attacks to their enemies. It seems like a “**virtual democracy**” since they have their own debate among the followers and sympathizers to discuss the diverse issues such as the ISI, ISIS, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict, Iran, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, suicide bombings outside Iraq or against civilian Muslims, Saudi Arabia, extremist *takfir*, other trend of Salafism, the authority of Islamist scholars, including Jihadi-Salafis. They consider that this electronic media is very important and safe in responding the growing awareness of the importance of this mission in the Jihadi “**war of the minds**” and its legitimacy as its integral part of *jihad*. Incrementally, this e-jihad creates what they call as “**Jihadi scholars**” and “**internet scholars**”.

al-Walla’ wa al-barra’: the fundamental root of Jihadi-Salafi apocalypse

The debates between the proponents of Modernity (*al-Hadatsah/al-Mu’asarah*) and Traditionality (*al-Turast*) are still undergoing in all Muslim’s thought in all over the world and in a sense that it is unstoppable wherever and whenever. The failure to understand the very idea of nation-states in which a constitution, democracy, harmonious life among the adherent of religions, race, class and ethnicity, respect for human dignity and human rights are

⁵Akeel Bilgrami, “The Shadow of Terror on Distant Muslims”, Abdou Filali-Ansary and Aziz Esmail (Eds), *The Construction of Belief: Reflections on the Thought of Mohammed Arkoun*, London: Saqi Books in Association with the Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations, 2012, pp. 165-6.

the core of the problem in which Fundamentalist⁶ or better called as Islamist has to take a strict different and divergent path. Hasan al-Turabi clearly, for example, stated that Islam itself is the constitution and legal system⁷. Sayyed Qutb also declared the same idea. The concept of *al-Hakimiyyah* (*tawhid hakimiyya*) is the very Qutbian ideology. It means that the sovereignty is only in God and totally rejects the concept of sovereignty of the people, as it is commonly stated in the nation-state's constitution. Those people who adopt the constitution of nation-state regarded as "*thaghut*". *Thaghut* originally means idol and is condemned on the principle of *tawhid* as *shirk*. In the time of Qutb the term has also acquired the political meaning of oppressive or unjust ruler who does not rule according to revelation (ruling out of revelation). And there comes the idea of *al-walla' wa al-barra'* then, an important principle in Salafism which means **loyalty to God, Islam and Muslim alone and disavowal of other religions and non-Muslims.**

This doctrine is quite powerful, instilled by social and political groups fighting each other for socio-political power in the Middle East. Theological-political strifes and disputes between Sunni and Shi'i are unstoppable, even deepened, in the various regions in the Middle East, and tend to venture into other areas, such as Middle Asia, and South Asia deeply rooted in the doctrine of *fiqh al-siyasah* (religious political doctrine) pattern in the such classic text and manuscript. The ideology of *takfir* or *takfiriyyah* originated from the Middle Eastern areas and spread out in society and in social media networks, i.e. considering other groups of different religious understanding and interpretations as infidel, apostle and unbelievers are also based on the doctrine of *al-wala' wa al-bara'* (loyalty and disavowal).

Ideology and Islamic socio-political practices declared by the founders of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syrian (ISIS), who declared a unilaterally *al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah* or *Daulah al-Islamiyyah* (Islamic State) is an antidote or antithesis of a democratic system of republic and constitutional government they consider failed⁸ in Iraq and Syria. The practice of Islamic caliphate (*al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah*) doctrine adopted by ISIS is really based on

⁶Peter Antes prefers to use the term "fanatic" or "radicalist" or "extremist" rather than Fundamentalist due to the fact that Fundamentalist (*Ushuliyyun - usul al-din* means the principle of religion) has a good meaning for some of the religious people. See Peter Antes "New Approaches to the Study of the New Fundamentalism", Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz, Randi R. Warne (Eds.), *New Approaches to the Study of Religion*, Vol. 1, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004, p.440.

⁷Hasan al-Turabi defines "*al-Islamiyyun*" (Islamist) as Muslim politician. For him, Islam is the only solution (*Islam huwa al-hall*). Islam is a religion and the governance; Islam is constitution and legal system. See Hasan al-Turabi, *al-Islam wa al-Hukum*. London: al-Saqi, 2003, p. 49.

⁸It is not easy to explain how the geopolitics of countries in the Middle East. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi ', a Palestinian, who lived and taught in Western universities, wrote the foreword of the book he edited, which is enough to explain helping with the hassle. See also Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi '(Ed.), *The Contemporary Arab Reader on Political Islam*, London and New York: Pluto Press, 2010.

doctrine of *al-wala' wa al-bara'* (loyalty and disavowal) in its strict and rigid way. Even the doctrine of loyalty and disavowal is not only limited to the selection of future leaders, but also extends to the historical and cultural areas. The destruction of places of worship belonging to other religions, the destruction of cultural sites and religions, such as temples, statues and other historic objects considered as a symbol of *shirk*, and contrary to the subjective understanding of *Aqeedah* and *Shari'ah* of Islam they understand.⁹ The climax of this uneasy and difficult position is a clot and fertility of sectarianism (*mazhabiyyah*), parochialism (*hizbiyyah*), primordial (*ta'ifiyyah*) in the Muslim community that weaken the solidarity of social life and socio-political life of the nation.

Really, this Jihadi-Salafi apocalypse is a type of religious political doctrine based on a classic and medieval understanding and interpretation of religious text and manuscript in an extreme opposite with the ultimate value of studying the modern social sciences promulgated from the seventeenth century to nowadays. According to Gudmund Hernes, a President of International Social Science Council, Social Science has a brand in new conception and its fundamental values in managing a state in a pluralistic society. I quote:

“To a great extent, the social sciences coming with new ideas about religion, reason, humanity and society were merged into a fairly coherent worldview that stressed human rights, individualism and constitutionalism. Studies of alien societies were used as a contrast when analysing a country’s institution and customs. A range of new, fundamental conceptions was articulated, for example: about the autonomy of the individual and inviolable rights; about individual freedom and the sovereignty of the people; about the tripartition of the state power and the independence of the state from religious supremacy; about the unfairness of inherited privileges; about the principles for organizing a market economy”.¹⁰

Furthermore, Hernes clarifies that the emergence of social sciences is equivalent with the rise of modernity in which the recognition that a plurality of opinions and an open, critical debate were necessary to gain new insights and for citizens to forge their own history. Education for all, including women, was articulated as a political goal. A free press and the dissemination of knowledge were regarded as a means for enlightenment and personal

⁹A description on the relationship between religion, politics and ideology, particularly with regard to the relationship and lack of continuity between heresy and *shirk* understanding and sensitivity and cultural history can be read in Mirza Tirta Kusuma, (Ed.), *Ketika Makkah Menjadi Seperti Las Vegas: Agama, Politik dan Ideologi*, (When Mecca looks like Las Vegas: Religion, Politics and Ideology), Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2014, pp.1-69.

¹⁰Gudmund Hernes, “Preface”, *World Social Science Report, 2010, : Knowledge Divides*, Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and International Social Science Council, 2010, p. vii. The bold is mine.

development. Power could only be legitimate if it promoted the welfare of the people. Even today, many of these issues remain contentious.

Here is a crucial point confronted by Muslim society elsewhere in the world. Here is the shortcomings and weaknesses of Islamic thinkers especially those who belong to the Jihadi-Salafi apocalypse groups and religious education in the Middle East in particular and in the Muslim countries in general, which is suspected by Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi' as Islamic thought which does not recognize and is lack of touch of social sciences and the valuable input of critical-philosophical-academic thinking commonly studied in the contemporary social sciences and humanities. I quote the view of Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi' as follows:

"The core of the field revolves around the *Shari'ah* and *Fiqh* studies that have been, very often, emptied of any critical or political content, or relevance to the present situation. A clear-cut distinction has been made between the "Theological" and the "political" or the "Theological" and the "social," with the former being Understood as rites, symbols, and historical text only. Furthermore, the perspective of the social sciences or critical philosophy is regrettably absent. The modern field of *Shari'ah* studies in the Muslim world has remained closed off to the most advanced human contributions in critical philosophy and social sciences".¹¹

Jihadi-Salafi apocalyptic theology is a part of our contemporary Islamic religious life. It is undeniable. I do agree with Abdullah Saeed when he listed six trends of Islamic thought today and mentioned that "Militant Extremism" is a part of contemporary Muslim life¹². Whether we agree or not, that is the reality. What should be done then in formulating and constructing of belief in the new world order in the 21st century?

Being Religious in the Changing World : Value, Vision, Strategy and Reformation of religious world-view in the new world order

¹¹Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', "A Post-September 11 Critical Assessment of Modern Islamic History", in Ian Markham and Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi', *11 September: Religious Perspectives on the Causes and Consequences*, Oxford: Oneworld, Publications, 2002, pp. 33-34. The bold is mine. Even in page 36 it is mentioned that "the discipline of the sociology of religion is looked upon as a heretic, or innovation, that does not convey the real essence of Islam". It is very timely to conduct a comparative study on the content, the method, the approach in the three big centers of Islamic education and discourses, namely al-Azhar, Egypt, International University of al-Madinah, Saudi Arabia and the University of al-Mustafa, in Iran to check in the field the validity of Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi's thesis. See Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai (Eds.), *Shaping Global Islamic Discourses: The Role of al-Azhar, al-Medina and al-Mustafa*, Edinburg: Edinburg University Press in Association with The Aga Khan University, (International) in the United Kingdom, Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilizations, 2015.

¹²Abdullah Saeed, *Islamic Thought: An Introduction*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 149. There are six trends of Islamic thought today, namely **Legalist Traditionalists, Political Islamists, Secular Muslims, Theological Puritans, Militant Extremists, and Progressive Ijtihadis**. pp. 142-154. The bold is mine.

It seems that it has been long necessary for the reform of Islamic thought to be launched by Muslim scholars, from Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal to Fazlur Rahman, and Nurcholish Madjid, to mention some of them. But the new Islamic world view – especially the unrenewed ones - is always confronted by new arising situations caused by the changing times, geopolitical shifts, and the increasing education and experience of mankind, beyond technological advances including the use of social media (internet, facebook, twitter, Whatsapp, instagram, gadget, telegram and so on) greatly exploited to disseminate any religious ideas, teachings, interpretations and understanding with their various contents.

Let's have the idea of the Constitution as an example. It is absolutely an accumulation of experience and long struggle of human history for centuries in the effort to govern good governance and power sharing. Not all believers, as a matter of fact, are comfortable and agreeable to the content of the Constitution. *Fiqh siyasah* of medieval political thought for example was not familiar with any power sharing, mainly Constitution. The Constitution, among others, is to prevent the accumulation of power on certain groups only, to prevent any uncontrolled struggle for power and interests and their accompanying conflicts in governing social life. Besides, there should be aware also of the derivative concepts of the Constitution such as human rights, including freedom of religion and belief, democracy, gender equality, equality before law and so on.

Indeed, it is the central themes in the life of the state and society in the modern era (*al-Hadatsah*) that have not been fully understood and well digested by the old system of traditional Islamic education (*al-Turats*). There was a clash of civilizations within the Muslim community between *al-Hadatsah's* and *al-Turats'* proponents with explosive outbreaks such as: *Islam is incompatible with democracy*, the system of Indonesian nation-state government and its apparatus, in particular the police are *thaghut*, the Pancasila state should be replaced by the system of *Khilafah Islamiyyah*, the widespread accusations of unbelievers (*takfiriyyah*) for people and groups with different opinion, different religious creed and moreover different religion, and the need to establish *Syariah NKRI* and so on.

Historically, these expressions and statements were not expressed at the time of the approval of the Youth Pledge of 1928 [One Country, One Nation and One Language] without the necessity of a single Religion, and at the time of the drafting of the 1945 Constitution. Even accurately and intelligently, Muslim delegations on the Preparatory of Independence Investigation Agency (*BPUPK*) - in order to preserve the national unity, unity of the Republic of Indonesia - agree and approve the proposal of the Eastern Indonesian people to exclude "seven words" [*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya* (with

the obligation for Moslems to perform their religious obligation)] in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution.¹³ Therefore, the Islamist ideology that presents the *Jihadi-Salafi apocalypse*, which among other things led to the proliferation of mutual apostasy-converts, mutual disbelief, and suicide bomb attacks throughout the Islamic world should be sought their roots and origin so that Muslims and the Indonesian people in general do not lose guidance and direction of life together in the future, are not careless, "missing", and able to anticipate what will happen in the future then.

The ideology of *takfir* and its consequences either softer or harsher in the form of MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council) fatwas for example¹⁴ is coming from out of Indonesia, strictly speaking the influence of *Jihadi-Salafi* apocalypse theology - without ignoring the internal roots of the country – which is very insensitive to the diversity of Indonesia that has been built very hard by the founding parents of the Indonesian country. Slowly but surely, Islamist ideologies from outside enter silently, infiltrate, sneak and infiltrate into internal Islamic religious movements in the homeland and especially MUI in the 2005s and above. **The strategy of infiltration, sneaking and inward infiltration is the most effective, safe and effective strategy used by Islamist groups to market their ideology within the community in religious organizations everywhere including college campuses and other lower educational institutions.** Openly, honestly as well as frankly, Indonesian Generations must now have the courage to see and revisit critically the methods of learning, syllabus and curriculum of elementary education, even kindergartens,¹⁵ Junior High (*Tsanawiyah*) and Senior High (*Aliyah*) schools, the curriculum of Pesantren in general and also of higher education around the world - domestically and abroad - where Indonesian students study in various countries both in the West and the East, including the Middle East.

¹³Yudi Latif, “Pancasila: Idealitas dan Realitas”, Kuliah Inaugurasi sebagai anggota Akademi Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (AIPI), Komisi Kebudayaan, Universitas Pancasila, Jakarta, 24 Juli 2017, pp.14-15.

¹⁴There are several MUI *fatwas* which more or less tend to contradict to unity, nationalism and Indonesianism such as the ones on : *Fatwa Pengharaman Sekularisme, Pluralisme, dan Liberalisme, Fatwa Sesat Ahmadiyah, Fatwa Pengharaman Doa Bersama Antaragama, Fatwa Pengharaman Kawin Beda Agama, Opini Keagamaan tentang Kesesatan Syiah, Opini Keagamaan tentang Kasus Penistaan al-Qur’an surat al-Maidah: 51 dan Fatwa Ucapan Selamat Natal.* Cf. Much Nur Ichwan's observation of the Islamist entry into the body of MUI in his “MUI, Gerakan Islamis dan Umat Mengambang”, in *Maarif*, Vol. 11, No. 2, December 2016.

¹⁵Let us see a piece of lyrics of a song called “Tepuk anak Soleh” followed by 3 times of applause as follows: "Aku followed by applauses (3 times) *Anak Soleh* (followed by applauses (3 times); *Rajin Sholat* (followed by applauses (3 times); *Rajin Ngaji* (followed by applauses (3 times); *Cinta Islam* (followed by applauses (3 times); *Sampai mati* (followed by applauses (3 times);. *Lailahailah, Muhammadurrosulullah. Islam .. Islam... Yes .. kafir, kafir No. See also: http://m.liputan6.com/regional/read/3045091/sepotong-lirik-lagu-tepuk-anak-soleh-picu-polemik-di-anyumas?utm_source=Mobile&utm_medium=whatsapp&utm_campaign=share_Top.* Retrieved 11 August 2017.

Is it really there and is growing now a generation of network of "new" Islamic scholars who emerged in the late 20th century (post-colonialism, post nation state) having completely different figures and ways of thinking and scientific appearance in the public from the ones of the generation of scholars as once researched and described by Azyumardi Azra in his *Jaringan Ulama* a few years ago?¹⁶ Of the "new" Ulama network, some of them are now occupying important positions in all Islamic organizations in the country, including the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), its spread to religious-social organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama, Persis, al-Khairat, Perti and others as well as public and private university campuses both participating in campaigning any voices that are no longer aligned with the tones and voices of Indonesianism, diversity, and plurality and those who are more or less assumably linked to a global-international Islamic education network, not to call it transnational?¹⁷

Along with the development of science and the methodology as well that sustains it in the last two centuries in social areas (sociology, anthropology), politics, economics, culture, science and technology, some scholars have noted that Islamic sciences are generally unfamiliar and unwilling to dialogues with the development of this new scientific vision, and even tend to resist, and often regard it as "*bid'ah* (heresy)". The allegations of heresy are very heavy because the originators and the heretics are considered heretical. And the heresy leads to hell (*Kullu bid'atin dhalalah Wa kullu dhalalatin fi al-naar*). Here are Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi's notes and observations:

“The absence of social science or critical philosophy perspectives from the field of Shari’ah studies can be illustrated by the fact that most students who acquire government scholarship to pursue their graduate education abroad, especially from the Gulf states, study only the hard sciences or business administration, supposedly value-free or criticism-free subjects. ... Closing the door to any type of critical perspective has been underpinning of the field of Religious Studies (especially Islamic Studies) and made it quite irrelevant. This fact has made it quite difficult in many Arab countries to encourage the growth of scientific tradition, developed mainly in the West, to study the complex interplay between religion and society in the modern Arab world. The discipline of the sociology of religion is looked upon as *bid'ah*, or innovation, that does not convey the real essence of Islam. Just like the study

¹⁶Azyumardi Azra, *Middle East and Middle East Scholars Network and Archipelago Archipelago XVII & XVIII (Tracing the Roots of Reformation of Islamic Thought in Indonesia*, Bandung: Mizan, 1998. The educated and educated generation now comparatively need to examine and elaborate the models and methods of learning at al- Azhar, Cairo of Egypt, the Islamic University of Madinah, in Madinah, in Saudi Arabia and the University of al-Mustafa, in Qum, Iran. The other book to refer and develop as further research material is: Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai (Eds.), *Shaping Global Islamic Discourses ...*, 2015.

¹⁷In his keen research and observations, Much Nur Ichwan clearly discloses the names, positions and educational backgrounds and supporting organizations that have been instrumental in shifting the direction and role of MUI especially since 2015. See Much Nur Ichwan, *MUI, Gerakan Islamis ...*, pp. 91-92.

of the modern Arab state systems, the sociology of religion is a necessity in the Arab world”¹⁸.

Here, I do not want to be trapped in this situation only, but we cannot ignore that in the study of contemporary Islamic literature, there are inputs, important notes and academic considerations that need to be reflected on its validity - and criticized if there is any incompatibility with the situation and the context of Indonesianism and Islam in Indonesia we are facing together today, in particular to redefine the key points that need to be scrutinized to build a new religious paradigm in the present new global-world era.

At least, there are 4 (four) important points to consider when trying to build the paradigm of "New Religiosity" - read: not a new religion - in the widespread *Jihadi-Salafi* apocalyptic theology in the Muslim world, those are the aspects of Value, Vision, Strategy and Reform of Islamic religious thought in the future.

1. Problem of Value in Islamic Jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) and *Kalam*

Indeed, the concept of *Tawheed* is the main basis and the paradigm foundation for Islamic civilization. And not only are the *divine values* in *Tawheed* related and connected to the side of Islamic spirituality, they are also **the basic philosophical framework (*al-ru'yah al-falsafiyah*) and the basic values (*al-qiyam al-asasiyyah*) of Islam in the understanding of universal humanity**. This is the biggest and toughest challenge in bringing about the value of *Tawheed* that is able to inspire social, cultural, and religious empathy and empathy for "religious Other", including empathy and sympathy for the notion of nationalism. The rigor of procedural reasoning (*al-'aql al-ijraiyy*) in *Fiqh* and *Kalam* in Islam (which is generally confined to the Qur'an, al-Hadis, Ijma 'and Qiyas) and the legal *fatwas* reasoning (*al-'Aql al-ifta'i*) as if it were closing the meeting of the universal values of humanity listed in the Qur'an, such as *al-karamah al-insaniyyah* (human dignity) and the concept of justice (*i'diluu walau 'ala anfusikum*) in Muslim understanding of the teachings and doctrines of *Tawheed* having been generally studied and taught. The understanding of *Tawheed* is the basis of value in the creativity and potential of Muslims to build a vibrant society, not static one as they have felt.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi', "A Post-September 11 Critical Assessment of Modern Islamic History", in Ian Markham and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' (Eds), *11 September: Religious Perspectives on The Causes and Consequences*, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002, p. 36.

¹⁹Muhammad al-Mestiry, *Jadal al-Ta'shil wa al-Mu'asarah fi al-Fikr al-Islamy* (The Dialectics of Tradition and Modernity in Islamic Thought), Tunisia: Mansyuraat Karim al-Syarif, 2014, p. 18. I use this book as one of

So far, the encounter of Islamic scientific thought and dialogue with other scientific disciplines tends to be conflictual and mutually exclusive. What happens today is more on divergence, rather than convergence. The experience of education in Indonesia, Islamic values, especially those inspired by the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine of the Middle East, tend to confront or even cross national values, diversity and Indonesianism.²⁰ Lecturers of the General Compulsory Lecture (MKWU) or major courses, especially the religious courses, the subjects of Citizenship and Pancasila in universities often have not been able to agree on dialogue and reconcile between religious values (Islam) and the values of nationality-Indonesian-ness. Especially at the level and levels that exist beneath it. One of the reason is that the nature of Islamic scholars is generally *centripetal*, moving inwardly into the axis, the axis of text (*nash*), rather than *centrifugal*, moving outward, wide, open, outward, through the field research as its axis.²¹

As a result, religion (Islam) is only preoccupied with ideology and power issues, and **does not pay attention to the scientific methodology aspects** in education and *fatwa*-issuing that are comprehensively studied before publicly issued. The nineteenth-century Wahhabi movement, and its further development and “marriage” with the contemporary Salafi movement, especially the *Jihadi-Salafi*-style,²² becomes the tangible evidence of today's historical reality. The reactions of contemporary Muslims to contemporary situations and conditions tend to be retrospective, nostalgic and romantic yearning for the glory and golden past of Islam (*al-'asr al-dhahaby*), then the basis of its scientific epistemology will always depend on the idealization of the historical past and the narrative-stories taken from the already available manuscripts. **The epistemology produces a static religious and religious thought, with no vision of civilization going forward.** Unfortunately, the efforts of reforming religious reasoning in Islamic culture have recently narrowed down the project of the Islamization of

the references of my doctorate students reading the course of *Filsafat Ilmu-ilmu Keislaman* (Philosophy of Islamic Sciences) at UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta since 2015.

²⁰A small example is the flag-saluting in the Red-and-White flag banner ceremony. It is surprising that one of the vice-presidents of the MUI has been polemic with the MUI leaders themselves and the community in these small matters, concerning the symbol of the unity of the nation. It appears that the influence of education, training and ideology from outside Indonesia has entered the heart of MUI. See Much Nur Ichwan, *MUI, Gerakan Islamis* ..., p. 91.

²¹ Hasan Hanafi, *Oksidentalism*, Najib Bukhori, (transl.), Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000, p. 128

²²An interesting discussion about *Jihadi-Salafism* is in the chapter 3 of Roel Meijer (Ed.), *Global Salafism*, pp. 245-300. One of them is Reuven Paz's, "Debates within the Family: Jihadi-Salafi Debates on Strategy, Takfir, Extremism, Suicide Bombings and the Sense of the Apocalypse", pp. 267-280 which has been slightly mentioned above.

science/knowledge²³ and missed the scientific methodology debate at the epistemological level of Islamic knowledge in the global civilization scene.²⁴

2. Problem of Vision of Civilization

There is no doubt that civilization is not only defined as a stationary and static noun, but also a dynamic-dialectical verb. The problem is that, **the vision of contemporary Islamic civilization has an excessive tendency towards religious reform movement in the field of power politics alone. Exactly, the vocabulary that comes up is a political nuance.** This is indeed suitable with the slogan of Islamists who always put forward the motto "*al-din wa al-daulah*" (religion and state / politics). It does not take into consideration any social aspect and let alone the culture, let alone get into the heart of science. Vocabularies such as *hakimiyyah*, *jihad*, *khilafah*, *takfiriyyah*, *taghout*, *salafi-jihadi* are political ones, **the fully-patterned and loaded vocabulary of Jihadi-Salafi Apocalypse.** This ultimately leads to the vision of civilization (*ru'yatu al-hadharah*) of Muslims to the ideals of utopian and nostalgic, such as *al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah*, *al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah*, *al-khilafah al-Islamiyyah*, later known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Suria). In the Indonesian context, it is really an absolute necessity to re-examine some of the MUI *fatwas*, religious views and opinions because they have been more or less loaded with and influenced by such a civilization vision though not as firm and clear as those in the Middle East.

Fundamental issues related to **education and social welfare** are not a priority scale as is done by other nations in the world. Yet it was the two things that once led the Islamic civilization era when Abbasiyyah achieve glory before European culture skyrocketed in the modern era of the 16th century and up. It means that the vision of Islamic civilization built today is not supported by a solid scientific epistemology and leads to the inability to understand the essence of the problem and to formulate creative solutions.

The above fact shows that contemporary Islamic civilization **does not have a fundamental and comprehensive vision of modern scientific civilization (*al-ru'yah al-hadatsah*)**.²⁵ The vision of civilization has to present how deep and far the ability of human

²³Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question: Reconciling Muslim Tradition and Modern Science* New York: I.B. Tauris Co Ltd., 2011, pp.116-131. The basic idea of Ismai'il Faruqi, which originally touched the depths of method and philosophy, even the study of religions, was then changed and simplified by the next generation of proponents of the Islamization movement of science into the "verse" or "scripturalization" of the findings of science. Simply, by way of embedding or attaching verses of the Qur'an and al-Hadith to the findings of research in science and social science. This is a type of "passive acquisition of knowledge".

²⁴Muhammad al-Mestiry, *Jadal al-Ta'shil ...*, pp. 19-20.

²⁵Fazlur Rahman has reminded this since the 1980s. See Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1982.

reasoning in navigating the direction of human life in today's and future civilizations is. Therefore, the contemporary Islamic civilization must be able to perform introspection, and can immediately **go out of the trap of interpretation and understanding of religious faith that is patterned antinomies, disharmony and dissociation** between Muslim-infidels, between Muslim-non-Muslims and **sectarian politics turning away from the universal principle of humanism.**²⁶

3. The Problem of Scientific Strategy

The Scientific Reform of Islamic thought should be based on an understanding of changes and priorities on ethical-social ethics (Ethico-legal). The current changes, as mentioned earlier in this paper, are scripturally-theologically valid, and not unusual.²⁷ The strategy and plan of Islamic scientific civilization is not sufficient in responding and facing the above changes. The unpreparedness has a direct impact on the formation of social, cultural and political attitude in society. The change is even responded with a defensive, sentimental, emotional and reactionary attitude. In addition, it tends to be unilaterally expressed, despotically interpreted, and without open dialogue, followed by demonstration, sweeping, prohibiting and threatening book discussions, dispersing scientific discussion forums and so on. Noteworthy, polemic attitudes with the problem of social and cultural changes will only lead to artificial, rather than substantial problem solving.

The necessary strategy to pursue is to re-understand basically the essence and meaning of common goodness on the basis of universal benefit and humanity to promote the realization of a just civilized society by involving all members of the society, rather than exclusively thinking Muslims. Contemporary Islamic legal thinkers and researchers criticize Muslims' understanding of the *Maqasid* (the purpose, the objective or the principle of Islamic teachings) in a conventional-traditional way, as it is generally understood, and which has resulted in the stagnation and impediment of developing a correct understanding of the concepts of justice, freedom, religious freedom, human rights, gender justice, pluralism, diversity, harmonious relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims, multiculturalism and so on. Jasser Auda has summarized some criticism of contemporary Muslim scholars and intellectuals as stated in the following:

“... 2. Traditional *maqasid* are concerned with individuals rather than families, societies, and humans, in general.

²⁶al-Mestiry, *Jadal al-Ta'shil* ..., pp. 20-21. See also the universal human vision of the Qur'an in *al-Hujurat*: 11-13.

²⁷Cf. the Qur'an in *al-Ra'd*: 11 and *al-Anfal*: 53.

3. The traditional *maqasid* classification did not include the most universal and basic values, such as justice and freedom.

4. Traditional *maqasid* were deduced from studying '*fiqh* literature,' rather than the original source/scripts.

.... **In order to remedy the individuality drawback, the notion of *maqasid* has been expanded to include a wider scope of people – the community, nation, or humanity, in general.**"²⁸

This strategy likely becomes urgent for the renewal of the methodology of thinking and expressed religious *fatwas* by teachers, lecturers, *ulama*, clerics, public figures, religious figures more to build and strengthen national consensus in national and state life as well as in the international community (world citizen) and guard against the whole human threat of ignorance, intolerance, poverty and so on. Therefore, **a collective, collaborative and comprehensive basis of collective scientific epistemology (*al-ma'rifah al-musyarakah; 'aqliyyah takamuliyah, al-tamazuj al-ma'rifi*) is needed to avoid a siege mentality, sectarian attitudes, as well as discriminating and racial ones.**

4. Reform of the epistemological roots of educational thought and Islamic law

The basic reform of the epistemology of Islamic thought with a critical review approach to the methodological references used and the need for social re-structuring and social reconstruction is essential, instead of the spirit of building a civilization based on religious rhetorics that leads to mythology and sacralism a certain understanding or interpretation of the teachings of Islam. Now it is beginning to rebuild the scientific tradition of *usul fiqh* (Fundamentals of Islamic law) and *Maqasid* theory by introducing contemporary Islamic methodology, but the effort only fulfills the minimal demands of a Muslim tradition which is still based on the formal-legal and procedural aspects of reasoning.

It seems that the revival of procedural and legal-formal reason only leads, nourishes and reinforces pragmatic and non-strategic Islamic religious thought. The jargon of the "*Khilafah Islamiyyah* (Islamic Caliphate)" and "Islam is the only way-out" (*al-Islam huwa al-hall*) is a real illustration as well as evidence that humanity on earth is only reduced in the Muslim or Muslim world alone, but ignoring the contribution of other religions, nations and other ethnicities (world civilizations), and finally colliding with the reality of multicultural society and religion (*al-jama'iyah al-ta'addudiyah*).²⁹ Such procedural thinking is only capable of

²⁸Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach*, Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1429 AH/2008 CE, pp. 4-5. The bold is mine.

²⁹Muhammad al-Mestiry, *Jadal al-Ta'shil ...*, pp. 28-29. Referring to Jasser Auda's observations as quoted above: that the main weakness of Muslim understanding of the old *Maqasid* theory is the loss of understanding of

producing "instrumental ratios" or simply and merely reinforces the ideals of closed-sectarian group identity in the contemporary era.

The reform of contemporary Islamic education and legal thought, especially the process of producing *fatwas*, views, opinions and religious attitudes, must involve and seriously consider developing opinions and theories by utilizing the achievements of human scholarship throughout history. In short, the reformation of the principles of education and Islamic law should be based on a multi-method, multi-dimensional, cross-disciplinary, multi-disciplinary approach, multi approaches (*ushul murakkabah muta'addidatu al-takhassusat*) and prioritize data and facts deeply observed in the field and in society (*al-muraqabah al-maidaniyyah*; the principle of evidentialism).³⁰

Multi and cross reference (*maraji'*) that compare and benefit from various scientific insights (social, economic, cultural, science, religion, politics, philosophy, language) is one of the absolute requirements that reformers of educational and legal thought contemporary Islam must have and meet, especially if religious organizations want to issue "fatwas" into the public sphere. Even Jasser Auda firmly argued:

“Without incorporating relevant ideas from other disciplines, research in the fundamental theory of Islamic law will remain within the limits of traditional literature and its manuscripts, and Islamic law will continue to be largely “outdated” in its theoretical basis and practical outcomes. The relevance and need for **multidisciplinary approach** to the fundamentals of Islamic law is one of the arguments of this book”³¹

Without going through such complex, cross-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary processes such Islamic legal and educational thought would only repeat the old (*al-qira'ah al-mutakarrirah*) diagnosis of socio-cultural and social cases and problems, the new politics and science, which are often treated and the fatwas issued by teachers, lecturers, clerics, ustadz, elite figures of society and politicians are inappropriate, ugly, and outdated (quaint; obsolete). Nidhal Guessoum calls this type of Islamic thought will be easy to collide and even crush by modern scientific thinking using empirical method (*al-muraqabah al-maidaniyyah*) and a more powerful and accurate way of thinking (overrun by modern knowledge).

“The next important issue is the need to engage the Islamic scholars in a serious dialogue and convince them that scientists have much to say on topics that have for too long remained

the more fundamental, substantial-general *maqasid* (such as justice, freedom, humanity) and more reduced on special *maqasid* only intended to guard and defend the interests of Muslims.

³⁰Muhammad al-Mestiry, *Jadal al-Ta'shil* ..., p. 28. The proposal of al-Mestiry is the same as the scientific paradigm approach I have introduced in the world of education in Indonesia by using the term **“Integrasi-Interkoneksi Keilmuan”** (Scientific Integration-Interconnection) when there is a process of institutional and scientific transformation within the State Islamic Religious Colleges (PTKIN) from the State Institute of Religious Affairs (IAIN) to the State Islamic University (UIN) in the 2000s. See further: Pokja Akademik, *Kerangka Dasar Keilmuan & Pengembangan Kurikulum Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta*, Yogyakarta: Universitas Islam Negeri Yogyakarta, 2006. See also M. Amin Abdullah, *Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi: Pendekatan Integratif-interkoneksi* (Islamic Studies in a Higher Education: Integration and Interconnection approach), Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006.

³¹Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Syariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*, ... p. XXVI. The bold is mine.

the monopoly of the religious scholars and their discourse. While there is no doubt in people's minds that human knowledge evolve and grows, **it is often understood that religions, especially Islam, are (is) absolute, immutable and transcendent principles, which are set in rigid frames of reference. But we know today that religions – and Islam is no exception – cannot afford to adopt a stationary attitude, lest they find themselves clashing with and overrun by modern knowledge, and religious principles appear more and more quaint and obsolete**".³²

Closing remarks

The four elements considered as a checklist tool, namely **Value, Vision, Strategy** and **Renewal** are mutually interrelated between one and another. The four elements constitute an integrated system. Each element is not independent, separate from one another. The four are simultaneously interwoven, checking, strengthening, correcting, criticizing and improving. If it is seen separately and separately, it is not the work of a system. In short, when viewed separately, it will not bring satisfactory results in science and will fail in therapying any difficulties or irregularities found on the praxis in the field. What is needed in our contemporary age is the higher order type of thinking, not the low order type of thinking.

So, it is necessary to check the list one by one on religious education and *fatwas* through the four integrated elements. It should also be noted that the implications and consequences of religious education and fatwa-issuing if the educational materials and fatwas, opinions, views, religious opinions do not meet any of the elements, the two elements let alone the four elements. What needs to be underlined and scrutinized in more detail and thorough is the **scientific strategy**. The question is then: Is the education in the era of *Jihadi-Salafi* apocalypse in educating and studying Islam and issuing religious fatwas so far still relying on the linearity-monodisciplinary power of jurisprudence (*fikh*) or religious *aqidah* (dogma) solely without reviewing and linking it with other scientific disciplines such as social sciences, politics, culture, economics and science in general? Or have the teacher, lecturer, cleric, Islamic scholars, public figure, religious elite figure, the figure of the Islamic religious organization, MUI started to move in using the multi, inter, cross and trans-disciplinary approach to socio-religious issues especially in relation to the life of the nation and the state? If so, what is the indicator? What should social members and observers of socio-religious issues, nationality and government do if faced with such situation? Can the awkwardness felt by society, government and observer of social life be reported to the Constitutional Court, Judicial Commission, and Supreme Court or other? Or does society have no place to complain at all?

³² Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question*, ..., p. 344. The bold is mine.

This era of religious disruption exposed through the *Jihadi-Salafi apocalypse* theology of this kind needs to be solved. Genuine inputs should be provided to all stakeholders, to the government and its ministries, state institutions, religious and social organizations and the community at large and even to academicians. This input is very necessary because education, *fatwas*, opinions, views, religious opinions from *muballigh*, *da'i* (religion preachers), teacher, lecturer, cleric, and ulama will directly enter the public space, touching all the dynamics of social relations both in the internal environment of Muslims and among religious denomination, and moreover the life of all citizens and nations in the world.

Finally, only religious education and lectures and *fatwas*, opinions, religious views and opinions that meet the moral standards of propriety and social appropriateness and intercultural values in the life of the nation and the state, and in the context of Indonesianness that are guided by the fundamental values of Pancasila, Diversity and Unity can be issued to the public sphere. Therefore, before being presented in classrooms and lectures, presented in majlis taklim, issued and published in the public space it is strongly recommended and obligatory that a series of public tests should be implemented in accordance with public inputs so that the product issued will not lead to controversy, dispute and even conflict in the community.

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